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A b s t r a c t   
The paper presents an analysis of valves used for closing and opening production tubing, 
located on the production line. The main safety valves analysed in this work are located in the 
Christmas Tree and in the Downhole Safety Valve. The analysis was conducted using FMEA; 
it found that for each basic Christmas Tree’s gate valve, the most dangerous failure modes are 
external leaks and  “fail to close” in the open position of the valves. For the Downhole Safety 
Valve, the most dangerous fault can occur in the open position of the valve. The Downhole 
Safety Valve and the Christmas Tree complement each other, thus ensuring safety during oil 
and gas production. 
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S t r e s z c z e n i e   
W artykule przedstawiono analizę zaworów przewodu wydobywczego, umiejscowionych w 
głowicy eksploatacyjnej oraz zawór wgłębny bezpieczeństwa. Analizę przeprowadzono 
metodą FMEA; stwierdzono, że dla każdego podstawowego zaworu zasuwowego głowicy 
eksploatacyjnej najgroźniejsze są wycieki zewnętrzne, a także uszkodzenie w pozycji 
otwartej. Podobnie dla zaworu wgłębnego bezpieczeństwa. Zawór wgłębny bezpieczeństwa i 
podstawowe zawory zasuwowe uzupełniają się nawzajem gwarantując bezpieczeństwo. 
Słowa kluczowe:  systemy bezpieczeństwa przy wydobywaniu ropy i gazu, zawory 
bezpieczeństwa w głowicy eksploatacyjnej 
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1.  Introduction  
Demand for oil and gas continues to grow, but ground-based hydrocarbon deposits 
begin to slowly deplete. Therefore, there is expected increase in performed offshore 
drillings and underwater installations in the coming years. Many wells located in shallow 
waters are already heavily exploited, so the search for hydrocarbons begins to move into 
deeper regions of the sea. Today, there are more than 9,000 offshore platforms operating 
worldwide, serving more than 10,000 wells, and their number will continue to grow [2]. 
The subsea mining industry puts a strong emphasis on the reliability of equipment. 
Equipment used in water are typically 5 times more expensive than equipment used for oil 
and gas extraction on land because all the situations of intervention or repair are associated 
with high costs. Breakdowns at sea can have additional devastating effects on the 
environment. An example is the 2010 explosion at the American platform rig Deepwater 
Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, which was the cause of the largest oil spill in the world. It is 
assumed that 780 000 m
3
 of oil leaked into the Gulf and the contaminated area consisted of 
6,500 to 176,000km
2
. Many factors are consisted during safe production of oil and gas from 
the seabed, but the most important components in the system of subsea production are 
subsea the Christmas Tree and the Downhole Safety Valve.  
2.  Christmas Tree 
The most important element in the subsea production system is the Christmas Tree 
(XT). The Christmas Tree is mounted on the wellhead at the seabed. The XT is a set of 
valves mounted on a specially designed steel block. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Subsea Christmas Tree [www.gizmodo.com] 
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The main task of the Christmas Tree is to control the flow of hydrocarbons from the 
well [5]. Christmas Trees also allow for the injection of various chemicals in order to 
remove or prevent the formation of hydrocarbon plugs, corrosion, or other prejudicial 
obstructions having bad influence to the production system. The design of the Christmas 
Tree also allows for access to the borehole in order to carry out all kinds of maintenance 
and workovers. The Christmas Tree can also be used for pumping water, gas or other 
factors to the lode. The Christmas Tree provides additional features, such as pressure and 
temperature monitoring and flow rate control. The construction of the Christmas Tree may 
vary depending on the requirements of the project and the area of extraction. The average 
body weight of a Christmas Tree is from 50 to 70 tonnes. Pressures of exploration for 
Christmas Trees are standardised and are successively 5,000 psi (35 MPa), 10,000 psi 
(69 MPa), 15,000 psi (103 MPa) and for ultra-deepwater Christmas Trees: 20,000 psi (138 
MPa) [6]. All valves in the Christmas Tree must withstand the same pressure as the 
Christmas Tree. All equipment is designed to operate at temperatures from 35° to 250°F 
(2°C to 120°C) [7]. Inside the Christmas Tree, the operating temperature is close to the lode 
temperature and pressure reservoir decreased by hydrostatic pressure related to the 
difference between the depth of the lode and the Christmas Tree as well as the linear and 
local losses. Linear losses derived from friction forces occurring between the elements of 
the fluid in all its mass and the friction against the walls of the passageway along its length. 
Take-offs are local obstructions in the flow and changes in the shape of the channel or the 
velocity of the stream.  
Very often, the wells are drilled at depths of 1,500 meters or more. Such depths put high 
demands on the technical issues; therefore, ultra-deepwater Christmas Trees are used for 
the exploration of such lodes. 
2.1.  Safety valves in Christmas Tree 
Three valves located in the Christmas Tree were analysed which are important in 
production of hydrocarbons : 
 Production Master Valve (PMV) is the primary and the most important valve in 
the Christmas Tree. It provides insulation between the borehole and the production 
tubing, wherein the hydrocarbons flow from the Christmas Tree to the manifold. 
During the exploitation of the lode, the valve is in the fully open position. The 
PMV must be strong enough to withstand the pressure prevailing in the well and 
prevent an uncontrolled leakage of hydrocarbons from the well. 
 Production Wing Valve (PWV) is used for closing and opening the XT under 
normal operating conditions. Just like the Production Master Valve, it is 
responsible for securing the flow of hydrocarbons from the well. 
 Annulus Master Valve (AMV) is the main valve preventing a leak of hydrocarbons 
from the wellbore to annulus [ 1 ]. 
These valves are fail-safe gate valves. It is a very popular type of valves used in 
Christmas Trees. This type of valves not only meets the safety function in the event of 
failure, but also allows for the closure of the valves in the XT without injecting heavy 
drilling mud into the well in order to eliminate flow from the reservoir into the hole. 
Closing the valves may be necessary, for example, during pressure and function tests [11]. 
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Fig. 2. Valves in Christmas Tree [Dril-Quip] 
The valves in the Christmas Tree are controlled via a subsea control module mounted 
directly on the XT. The subsea control module contains the electronics, hydraulics and 
instrumentation needed for the safe and effective control of valves in the XT and the 
Downhole Safety Valve. In addition, the subsea control module is responsible for the 
distribution of the electric current monitoring signal and for communication with the 
surface. Modern subsea control modules must have reliability for water depths of up to 
3000 meters and pressures of 20,000 psi (138 MPa). 
In order to allow for the closing or opening of valves  directly and independently of the 
control system, Christmas Trees are equipped with a panel, which allows for the direct 
control valve to use the remotely operated vehicle (ROV). Direct control of valves may be 
necessary for the assembly or disassembly of the XT of maintenance or failure of the 
control system. 
3.  Downhole safety valve 
A very important valve, which is not located in the Christmas Tree, but it is controlled 
by it, is the Downhole Safety Valve (DHSV). The DHSV is mounted in a completed 
wellbore at a depth ranging from 100 to 500 meters below seabed. It is a flap-type valve 
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and it is intended to prevent the uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from the lode in the 
event of an emergency when other valves have failed. The DHSV is controlled with 
hydraulic fluid by the Christmas Tree. 
 
 
Fig. 3. DHSV valve [www.whcp-oilgas.com] 
4.  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative method, which is used to 
identify potential errors or defects, and to assess their effects. Many industries require for 
the FMEA to be used in the design of technical systems and that its sheets to be part of the 
system documentation. Provisions in the oil industry also require a similar analysis. The 
analysis uses specific FMEA sheets, in which, inter alia, it distinguishes the failure modes 
of individual elements or severity of the ranking. Failure mode is a description of a possible 
malfunction of the element that prevents the required function, which answers the question; 
how the machine crashes. Modes and causes of damage for the valves depend on the 
particular design. For a standard subsea gate valve installed in the Christmas Tree, the 
following typical modes and their corresponding causes as well as mechanisms of damage 
may be mentioned: 
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T a b l e  1 .   
Failure modes and possible causes of it 
 
4.1.  Classification of the severity of fault 
The classification of the severity of the effects provides the qualitative dimension of the 
worst potential consequences of design errors or equipment failures. Each identified failure 
mode and analysed element is subject to the classification of the severity of the impact. 
Classification is used in both FMEA and FMECA. The categories are divided into: 
 Category I (catastrophic) – failure results in death of workers or huge loss of 
devices preventing further execution of the planned objectives of the system. 
 Category II (critical) – failure causes the degradation of the system beyond 
acceptable limits, creating a security risk (contributing to the death or injury of 
employees, if they are no taken steps to combat the risk). 
 Category III (severe) – the failure of the system degrades the bounds of safety, but 
there is a possibility to appropriately counteract the effects. 
 Category IV (reduced) – failure does not degrade the whole system performed 
beyond the acceptable limits of safety, causing one of the various disadvantages of 
the system. 
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5.  Results 
Analysed PMV, PWV, AMV and DHSV. Distinguished two modes of operation: the 
valve in the open and closed positions and whether the damage is detectable, and each 
failure mode has been classified according to the classification of the severity of the impact. 
Table 2 presents an exemplary FMEA sheet that was used while analysing. 
The Downhole Safety Valve is the primary barrier and is designed to cut off the 
Christmas Tree from lodes. For DHSV in the open position, the most dangerous failure 
mode is "left open the valve," which have been classified in the classification of the 
severity of fault "leakage through the valve" as a critical fault. Failure mode "fail to close" 
is extremely dangerous when the situation requires, for example, a fire on the platform. In 
this case, it is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the valves in the Christmas 
Tree. If the secondary barrier does not fulfil its function, the platform will still be 
transmitting hydrocarbons, which will result in such a situation as an explosion on the 
surface. Failure mode "leakage through the valve" causing damage to the sealing flap is 
dangerous due to the fact that the valve does not close the flow of hydrocarbons in the 
situation required. It is then necessary to activate the valves in the XT, which violates the 
integrity of the subsea safety at oil and gas production. A major failure mode is 
uncontrolled shutdown. In this case, there is no assurance that the valve will work and close 
properly, and on the other hand, there is the possibility that the valve closes spontaneously 
in normal production, causing downtime and thus financial losses. 
The secondary barrier is the Christmas Tree and its main valve is the Production Master 
Valve. In case of failure, DHSV is the first valve that is designed to cut off the flow of 
hydrocarbons through the Christmas Tree. This is a very important component of the XT 
because its failure contributes to an increased risks associated with not closing the whole 
XT. Failure modes in the basic gate valves of XT are classified from serious to catastrophic 
consequences. All considered, gate valves (PMV, PWV, AMV) in both operating modes 
external leak hydrocarbons cause disastrous consequences. In such a situation, it requires 
keen DHSV or the XT, otherwise it may lead to an ecological catastrophe caused by the 
contamination of seawater, and thus huge financial losses. If the DHSV works, an 
ecological catastrophe does not occur, but it is necessary to draw all the XT and 
replacement of the damaged valve. If the DHSV does not work, but the other valve is 
closed, it will not be possible to immediately draw the XT. In such a situation, injection of 
heavy drilling fluid into the wellbore would be needed. Each day of downtime in 
production is associated with financial losses, but also to draw all the XT generates 
additional costs. With the exception of an external leak, all failure modes in AMV have 
serious consequences. Analysing PMV and PWV in operation in the open position failure 
mode "fail to close" "internal leak" caused damage to the piston seal and the "uncontrolled 
shutdown" necessitate the activation of other valves, and thus in case of requiring situation 
increases the probability associated with the failure to close the entire XT. In addition, the 
occurrence of even one of these failure modes leads to stoppage of the whole production in 
order to repair the fault. In contrast, the occurrence of leakage caused by damage to the 
inner piston seal also will stop production because the hydraulic pressure in the chamber, 
the rod falls, and thus the valve closes. Failure mode "uncontrolled shutdown" is not a 
dangerous fault because it does not contribute to an increase in the danger of the production 
of hydrocarbons, but the effects of this mode are felt from the economic side. 
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The analysis can be concluded that for each basic gate valve of XT, the most dangerous 
are an external leak and the failure mode "fail to close" in the open position of the valves. 
Any failure of an individual valve that makes the extraction of hydrocarbons becomes less 
and less secure. An indispensable component of the safety system of subsea production is 
the DHSV, the most dangerous defects can occur in the open position of the valve. The 
DHSV and the Christmas Tree complement each other, thus ensuring the security of oil and 
gas production. 
 
 
R e f e r e n c e s  
[1] Norsok Standard D-010. 
[2] Perrin D., Well Completion and Servicing, Technip 1999, 153-156. 
[3] Rausand M., Reliability of Safety-Critical Systems: Theory and Applications, 
Wiley 2014, 53-76. 
[4] Samir D., Fundamentals of Oil & Gas Industry for Beginners, Notion Press 
Chennai 2015. 
[5] Young B., Qiang B., Subsea Engineering Handbook, Elsevier, 2010. 
  
 
 
 
